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Abstract—Defending against botnets has always been a cat
and mouse game. Cyber-security researchers and government
agencies attempt to detect and take down botnets by playing the
role of the cat. In this context, a lot of work has been done
towards reverse engineering certain variants of malware families
as well as understanding the network protocols of botnets to
identify their weaknesses (if any) and exploit them. While this
is necessary, such an approach offers the botmasters the ability
to quickly counteract the defenders by simply performing small
changes in their arsenals.
We attempt a different approach by actually taking the role of
the Botmaster, to eventually anticipate his behavior. That said, in
this paper, we present a novel computational trust mechanism for
fully distributed botnets that allows for a resilient and stealthy
management of the infected machines (zombies). We exploit
the highly researched area of computational trust to create an
autonomous mechanism that ensures the avoidance of common
botnet tracking mechanisms such as sensors and crawlers. In
our futuristic botnet, zombies are both smart and cautious. They
are cautious in the sense that they are careful with whom they
communicate with. Moreover, they are smart enough to learn
from their experiences and infer whether their fellow zombies
are indeed who they claim to be and not government agencies’
spies. We study different computational trust models, mainly
based on Bayesian inference, to evaluate their advantages and
disadvantages in the context of a distributed botnet. Furthermore,
we show, via our experimental results, that our approach is
significantly stronger than any technique that has been seen in
botnets to date.
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets are networks of infected computing devices, called
bots. These bots can be remotely controlled and instructed
to conduct criminal activities by malicious entities that are
commonly referred to as botmasters. Botnets are used for a
multitude of malicious activities such as Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS), banking theft or spam email distribution.
For this reason, researchers attempt to defend against botnets
by proposing novel detection and prevention methods; for
instance, intrusion detection systems, honeypots, etc. [11],
[14].
Traditionally, many botnets have been based on a centralized
architecture consisting of a Command and Control (C2) server
that relays commands directly to the bots. However, this
architecture presents a Single Poing of Failure (SPoF) in the
centralized server which can be used to seize control of the
botnet. Therefore, more advanced botnets implement a C2
channel based on unstructured Peer-to-peer (P2P) overlays.
These botnets do not inherit the SPoF of centralized ap-
proaches. Furthermore, they are very resilient to node churn
and node removal attacks [13].
As the lack of a central server prevents easy monitor-
ing, researchers have developed various means for gather-
ing intelligence in P2P botnets. This is usually achieved
by first reverse engineering the communication protocol and
afterwards deploying crawlers and sensors to enumerate the
botnet population. Nevertheless, botnets such as Sality [5] or
GameOver Zeus [2] already implement features to impede
monitoring attempts.
Within this work we present a novel approach to thwart
monitoring attempts by researchers and law-enforcement agen-
cies. The proposed mechanism is based on the utilization of
computational trust along with special crafted messages that
the bots exchange to verify the correct behavior of their peers.
Our work is one among others published recently that present
means to detect monitoring operations in P2P botnets [1],
[4], [8], [9]. This suggests that the options to harden P2P
botnets are manifold and may eventually prevent successful
monitoring entirely. Therefore, we want to highlight that the
need for developing new mechanisms to efficiently gather
intelligence on P2P botnets is urgent.
II. TRUST ENABLED SENSOR DETECTION ON P2P
BOTNETS
In the following, we will introduce our trust mechanism
based approach to detect sensors in P2P botnets. For this, we
first introduce some background on P2P botnet Membership
Management (MM) and computational trust mechanisms. Af-
terwards, we explain how computational trust can be used to
identify and automatically blacklist sensor nodes deployed by
researchers or law enforcement agencies.
a) Botnet Membership Management: To ensure that the
P2P botnet remains connected in the presence of churn, i.e.,
nodes joining and leaving the network, a MM system is used
to frequently update connection information. Each bot in a P2P
network maintains a list of other bots. This list is commonly
referred to as Neighborlist (NL) and the bots stored within the
NL are called neighbors.
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(a) Visualization of sensor popularity after joining the network (b) Visualization of sensor popularity 14 days later.
Figure 1: Visualization of sensor popularity after joining the network and 14 days later. Sensors are depicted in blue and benign
bots in green.
Each bot regularly contacts its neighbors to check their
responsiveness as well as to receive updated commands. If
all neighbors are unavailable, a bot is isolated from the botnet
and will not be able to receive any updates or botmaster com-
mands. Therefore, it is important to update the NL frequently
by replacing inactive neighbors with other active bots. This is
accomplished by sending probing messages to all bots in the
NL for availability within a fixed interval, called MM cycle.
These probing messages are commonly referred to as hello
messages.
If a node remains unresponsive for a prolonged period of
time, it will be replaced by a “fresh” entry of an online
bot. Furthermore, botnets also use the MM cycle to exchange
information about the ID of the latest instruction set. If one bot
does not have the most current update it will query a neighbor
to forward the latest instruction set. In the case of the Sality
botnet, this ID is directly embedded in the hello and hello
reply messages.
b) Computational Trust: Trust is a familiar term for
human beings, who make a plethora of trust-based decisions
on a daily basis. Usually a person or trustor engages with
another person or trustee based on the assumption that the
trustee will behave as the trustor expects it [10].
Computational trust provides a means to model the con-
cept of trust for computers and other devices. In particular,
evidence-based trust mechanisms use experiences, collected
from past interactions, to predict the future behavior of the
trustee. These experiences can either be first-hand experiences
from prior interactions with the trustee or second-hand expe-
riences shared by other trustors through recommendations or
referrals [3], [12].
c) Disclosing Sensor Nodes: Our mechanism, for dis-
closing sensor nodes, builds on the assumption, that sensors
and crawlers will not aid the botnet in any way or form. This is
a common assumption [8], as even law-enforcement agencies
have to adhere to national and international laws as well as
ethics. In more details, our work assumes that a sensor is
not allowed to participate in malicious activities of the botnet
and/or to disseminate (to other benign bots) new versions of
malware or command sets originating from the botmaster.
We exploit this, by introducing a new type of message,
called Bogus Command Sequence (BCS) message, which is
designed to disclose the unwillingness of sensors to participate
in criminal activities1. As we have explained in Section II-0a,
bots frequently exchange hello messages that include the ID
of the latest botmaster command. In the BCS message a bot
does not attach its real command ID, but instead chooses a
significantly lower value. A regular bot will respond to this
message with its current command ID and the latest update
attached in the reply. However, a sensor cannot forward a valid
command update without violating the assumption that it may
not participate in criminal activities.
A bot will frequently send these BCS messages to its neigh-
bors to probe them for their trustworthiness. Upon receiving
anything but a recent command ID together with a valid com-
mand update, the engagement will be considered a negative
experience. We use the recorded experiences together with
evidence-based trust models to make trust-based decisions. In
more details, when the calculated trust score, of a bot, falls
below a certain (predefined) threshold, this bot is considered
to be a sensor. As such, the sensor is removed from the NL
of the bot, added to a blacklist and all incoming messages in
the future will be ignored.
To avoid engaging in criminal activities, a sensor could
respond to a BCS message in three different ways:
1Note that our work can be easily extended to crawlers as well. However,
since crawlers are relatively easy to detect, we consider them out of the scope
of this paper.
• it can reply with the same command ID
• it may not reply at all
• it can attempt to corrupt the payload on purpose before
sending a reply
Note that while each of these replies is considered a negative
experience by a bot, it is possible that a real bot responds
similarly on rare occasions. As an example, a response may
actually be corrupted due to certain network problems, or a
bot might go offline during the interaction (and therefore it
does not send a response).
To avoid blacklisting a bot preemptively based on a single
negative experience, we record multiple experiences. These
are then used as an input to make blacklisting decisions
given a computational trust model. To identify which model
is best suited, we evaluated our approach using four different
computational trust models. Namely these are, the ebay user
rating trust model, the beta distribution, subjective logic [7],
and certain trust [12]. Our preliminary results indicate, that
the ebay trust model performs the best, even though it is the
most basic of all four models2.
In Figure 1, the connectivity of 10 sensors is depicted at the
beginning of a simulation and after 14 days of simulation. As
it is depicted in the figure, the popularity, i.e. the in-degree, of
all sensors decreases significantly throughout the simulation.
In fact, with the ebay trust model we were able to reduce the
popularity of sensors by more than 97% in comparison to the
original Sality botnet protocol.
III. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We have shown, that computational trust can be used as a
mechanism to greatly diminish the monitoring information that
can be obtained with sensor nodes. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first work that approaches anti-monitoring
mechanisms from a non graph-theoretic perspective. Hereto-
fore, the state of the art in anti-monitoring mechanisms has
been utilizing protocol-level anomaly detection [1] and/or
graph-theoretic approaches to detect the activity of crawlers
or sensors in P2P botnets [4], [8].
We argue that the work presented here is one of many
different possible anti-monitoring mechanisms that can be
deployed in the P2P botnets of the near future. Therefore, we
want to press the issue that P2P botnet monitoring will not
be possible to the same extent as it is now. Furthermore, legal
and ethical boundaries greatly restrict the range of options
for researchers and law-enforcement. In fact, such limitations
are expected to further grow in the future; for instance via the
enforcement of the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [6]. Finally, we argue that collaborative
monitoring may be a way to mitigate the effect of some
anti-monitoring mechanisms. Nevertheless, due to the sheer
amount of possible anti-monitoring mechanisms, we strongly
believe that regulators and researchers have to work together to
2It should be noted, however, that the ebay system, being the simplest one,
is the only one who introduces (a low number) of false positives. In contrast,
the remaining three computational trust mechanisms can achieve a precision
of 1.
develop botnet monitoring mechanisms that can not be easily
detected by botmasters while adhering to the applicable legal
systems.
In our future work, we plan to present our computational
trust-based method in a more formal and detailed manner. In
addition, we are currently performing full-fledged simulations
to measure the extent of our method’s performance in a highly
realistic scenario. Moreover, we plan to further analyze the
usage of colluding sensors and their effectiveness, for collab-
orative monitoring, in such a resilient botnet environment.
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